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Success Exponent of Wiretapper:
A Tradeoff between Secrecy and Reliability
Chung Chan
Abstract—Equivocation rate has been widely used as an
information-theoretic measure of security after Shannon[12]. It
simplifies problems by removing the effect of atypical behavior
from the system. In [11], however, Merhav and Arikan consid-
ered the alternative of using guessing exponent to analyze the
Shannon’s cipher system. Because guessing exponent captures
the atypical behavior, the strongest expressible notion of secrecy
requires the more stringent condition that the size of the key,
instead of its entropy rate, to be equal to the size of the message.1
The relationship between equivocation and guessing exponent
are also investigated in [8][9] but it is unclear which is a better
measure, and whether there is a unifying measure of security.
Instead of using equivocation rate or guessing exponent, we
study the wiretap channel in [2] using the success exponent,
defined as the exponent of a wiretapper successfully learn the
secret after making an exponential number of guesses to a
sequential verifier that gives yes/no answer to each guess. By
extending the coding scheme in [2][6] and the converse proof
in [4] with the new Overlap Lemma V.2, we obtain a tradeoff
between secrecy and reliability expressed in terms of lower
bounds on the error and success exponents of authorized and
respectively unauthorized decoding of the transmitted messages.
From this, we obtain an inner bound to the region of strongly
achievable public, private and guessing rate triples for which
the exponents are strictly positive. The closure of this region is
equivalent to the closure of the region in Theorem 1 of [2] when
we treat equivocation rate as the guessing rate. However, it is
unclear if the inner bound is tight.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The basic model of a cryptographic/secrecy system involves
a sender Alice who wants to send a message S as secretly as
possible to the intended receiver Bob. The basic model of
a cryptanalytic attack, on the other hand, involves a crypt-
analyst/wiretapper Eve who attempts to learn the secret as
much as possible based on her observation Z. How secretly
a message is sent, or how much information is leaked, must
therefore be quantified before one can design and optimize a
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1This is the condition for a finite system to achieve perfect secrecy as
pointed out by Shannon[12].
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cryptographic system or a cryptanalytic attack for the respec-
tive purposes.
The aposteriori probability function PS|Z is a sufficient
statistics of the security of the system as it gives all the
possible values of the secret and their associated probabilities
for every possible realization of the wiretapper’s observation.
In particular, the important notion of a system being perfectly
secure, referred to as perfect secrecy by Shannon[12], can
be characterized as the aposteriori probability equal to the
prior, i.e. PS|Z = PS. In other words, Eve’s observation is
independent of the secret, or equivalently, the system is at the
same level of security whether Z is observed or not.
It is convenient to summarize the aposteriori probability
function by the index called equivocationH(S|Z). It is roughly
the amount of information the wiretapper needs to gather in
addition to Z to perfectly recover S. One precise operational
meaning of equivocation, as illustrated in Fig. 1, is the
minimum achievable rate for source coding an iid sequence
of S(n) with the iid sequence of Z(n) as side information at
the decoder.2 To achieve perfect secrecy, it is necessary and
sufficient to haveH(S|Z) = H(S). Alice can also try to protect
the secret up to an equivocation H(S|Z) below H(S) if perfect
secrecy is costly and unnecessary.
The amount of additional information Eve needs to gather
to break the system may not reflect how difficult it is to obtain
them. For example, getting just one bit of information from
Alice or someone who know the secret may require significant
effort in the search for that person, followed by lengthy
interrogation. In some situations, Eve does not play a passive
role of receiving additional information that is concisely stated
(i.e. maximally compressed by a genie), but instead plays an
active role in identifying and extracting relevant information
from disorganized sources. Thus, one should question whether
equivocation is applicable for the case of interest, albeit its
mathematical convenience.
A natural alternative measure of security, as investigated
2This is the correction data model originally proposed by Shannon[12]
except that the genie does not need to know Z nor any decision feedback
from Bob.
2by Merhav and Arikan[11], is roughly the ability that Eve
perfectly learn the secret from yes/no answers to “Is the secret
equal to ...?” type of questions. In the model, Eve sequentially
verify her guesses of the secret by asking yes/no questions. The
number of guesses and verifications she needs to make until
she is within some probability of guessing the secret correctly
indicates her effort and ability to extract information about the
secret. Sometimes the system itself provides such a verifier
which help correct careless mistakes made by the authorized
user. This potentially leaks information to unauthorized users
who also have access to the verifier, just as in the case of a
login system. As a system designer, he may be interested to
know how many wrong passwords should be allowed for each
session so that the chances of successfully breaking into the
account is reasonably small. Although this success probability
does not have a way to express the notion of perfect secrecy in
general (See Example A.1), it is a natural fit for this problem
as it provides the number of trials as an additional parameter
to optimize.
In the sequel, we will consider the wiretap channel problem
in [2]. A key result from [2] is the single letter characterization
of the secrecy capacity, defined as the maximum rate at which
the secret can be transmitted to Bob by a block coding scheme
with arbitrarily small error probability and the equivocation
rate equal to the message rate. Transmitting at rate above this
secrecy capacity, one faces the trade-off a lower equivocation
rate. Transmitting at rate below the secrecy capacity, however,
equivocation rate is capped at the message rate. There seems
to be little point in further reducing the rate below secrecy
capacity. If one also cares about delay, i.e. how fast the error
probability converges to zero, further reducing the rate below
secrecy capacity can be beneficial. What is the tradeoff then?
Secrecy comes with a cost of reliability of the authorized
decoding. To characterize which level of secrecy and reliability
are simultaneously achievable for each rate, we will use
the standard notion of error exponents for Bob and Eve
in decoding their messages as a measure of reliability. For
secrecy, we will use the exponent of the success probability,
or success exponent for short, that Eve learns the secret within
an exponential number of guesses.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. Sec-
tion III defines the wiretap channel problem we consider.
Section IV describes the proposed coding scheme. Section V
explains the computation of the success exponent using a
technique we call the Overlap Lemma V.2. Section VI explains
the computation of the error exponents using the Packing
Lemma[3]. Finally, the desired lower bounds on the exponents
will be stated in Section VII. Section VIII gives the conclusion
and some open problems. For readers who would like to skip
to the main result, Section II provides a brief summary of
notations.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Calligraphic font denotes a set, e.g. A, which is always
assumed finite unless otherwise stated. 2A and Ac denote the
power set and complement of A respectively. A ∪ B, A ∩ B
and A \ B denotes the usual set operations, which are the
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union, intersection, and difference respectively. Avga∈A (or
Avga for short) denote the averaging operation 1|A|
∑
a∈A. R,
R+ and Z+ denotes the set of real numbers, non-negative
real numbers, and positive integers. Occasionally without
ambiguity, a positive integer L will also be used to denote
the set {1, . . . , L} as in l ∈ L. Bold letter such as x denotes
an n-sequence {x(i)}ni=1 = (x(1), . . . , x(n)); and u◦x denotes
element-wise concatenation {(u(i), x(i))}ni=1.
San serif font is used for random variables and stochastic
functions, e.g. X, f and Wb. P(Y)X denotes the set of all
possible conditional probability distributions PY|X of a random
variable Y taking values from Y , denoted as Y ∈ Y , given
a random variable X ∈ X . The (conditional) probability
distribution will also be viewed as a row vector (matrix).
e.g. PXPY|X denotes the matrix multiplication, which gives
the marginal distribution PY. PX ◦ PY|X denotes the direct
product, which gives the joint distribution PX,Y of the pair
(X,Y) in this case. Pn
X
denotes the n-th direct product
such that PX(x) =
∏n
i=1 PX(xi). For any subset A ⊂ X ,
PX(A) =
∑
x∈A PX(x). E(X) denote the expectation of X.
δvar(P,Q) denotes the variation distance (25) between P and
Q.
Following the notations in [3] for the method of types,
Px and Py|x denotes the type (6) and respectively canonical
conditional type (8). ‘Canonical’ refers to the constraint (for
convenience) that Py|x(y|x) = 1/|Y| if Px(x) = 0 for all
(x, y) ∈ X × Y . T
(n)
Q or TQ for short denotes the class of n-
sequences of type Q. TV (x) denotes the V -shell of x. Pn(X )
denotes the set of all types for sequences in Xn. Vn(Q,Y)
(Vn(Q) or Vn for short) denotes the set of all canonical condi-
tional types V for sequences in Yn. I(Q, V |P ), D(V ‖W |Q),
and H(V |P ) are the conditional mutual information (29),
divergence (10) and entropy (11) respectively. I(x ∧ y) (20)
denotes the empirical mutual information. Equivalently, we
write TX := TPX and TY|X := TPY|X , which are non-empty if
the corresponding distributions are valid (conditional) types.
|TY|X| denote |TPY|X(x)| with x ∈ TX.
To express inequality in the exponent for functions in n, we
use an
.
6 bn to denote lim supn→∞ 1n log an is no larger than
lim infn→∞
1
n
log bn. A piecewise function will be expressed
in terms of |a|+ := max{0, a} and |a|− := min{0, a}.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Transmission model
Fig. 2 illustrates a single use of the discrete memoryless
wiretap channel (Wb,We) using the dummy random variables
X, Y and Z. Alice sends a random variable X through the chan-
nel. PX ∈ P(X ) is the probability distribution function/vector
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of X over the finite set X , such that PX = Pr{X = x} (x ∈ X )
and PX(A) = Pr{X ∈ A} (A ⊂ X ).
The channel is denoted by the pair (Wb ∈ P(Y)X ,We ∈
P(Z)X ) of conditional probability distributions. We write
Wb(X) and We(X) as the channel output Y and resp. Z
observed by Bob and resp. Eve. The conditional distribution
PY|X(y|x) := Pr{Y = y|X = x} equals Wb(y|x) for all
(x, y) ∈ X×Y , and similarly for PZ|X. For the case of interest,
all sets X , Y and Z are finite and the correlation between Y
and Z given X need not be specified.
To transmit information through this channel, we will con-
sider the (data) transmission model illustrated in Fig. 3 with
block length n. Following [2], we consider n uses of the
channel with stochastic encoding, and deterministic decoders
at the receivers. As pointed out in [2], stochastic encoding, i.e.
randomization in the encoder during transmission, increases
secrecy by adding noise as a physical barrier to eavesdropping
while deterministic decoding does not lose optimality for the
case of interest.
As shown in Fig. 3, Alice chooses a public/common message
m out of a set of M possible messages to convey to both Bob
and Eve, and a private/secret/confidential message l ∈ L only
to Eve. (l ∈ L is a short-hand notation for l ∈ {1, . . . , L}.)
Since the message m for Eve is a degraded version of the
message (m, l) to Bob, this is identical to the asymmetric
broadcasting of degraded message sets[3] except for the
additional secrecy concern.
In the transmission phase, Alice first passes the message
through a stochastic encoder denoted by the conditional prob-
ability distribution f ∈ P(Xn)M×L. We write f(m, l) as the
output codeword, which is denoted by the dummy random n-
sequence X := {X(i)}ni=1 in Fig. 3. The encoder can be viewed
as an artificial channel, through which the output codeword X
of the message (m, l) must satisfy Pr{X = x} = f(x|m, l).
It effectively adds additional noise to make it hard for Eve to
learn the secret. This artificial noise also affects Bob since he
does no know it a priori.
Alice then transmits the random codeword X through n uses
of the wiretap channel. The n-th extension of the wiretap chan-
nel is characterized by the n-th direct power (Wnb ,Wne ), where
Wnb (y|x) =
∏n
i=1Wb(y
(i)|x(i)) and similarly for Wne . Bob
uses his channel output Y to decode both the public and private
messages with a deterministic decoder φb : Yn 7→ M × L.
Φb :M × L 7→ 2Y
n denotes the decision region so that
(1) φb(y) = (m, l) ⇐⇒ y ∈ Φb(m, l)
Similarly, Eve uses her channel output Z to decode the public
message with decoder φe : Zn 7→ M and decision region
Φe : M 7→ 2
Zn
. She, however, also generates an unordered
set of λ ≤ L distinct guesses of the secret using a list decoder
ψ : Zn 7→ {A ⊂ L : |A| = λ}, which is a correspondence.
The decision region Ψ : L 7→ 2Zn satisfies
(2) l ∈ ψ(z) ⇐⇒ z ∈ Ψ(l)
The triple (f, φb, φe) will be called an (n-block) wiretap
channel code, while the list decoder ψ will be called the list
decoding attack (with deterministic list size). The quadruple
(f, φb, φe, ψ) will be called an (n-block) transmission (model)
for the wiretap channel.
B. Achievable rate and exponent triples
The performance of a wiretap channel code with respect to
a list decoding attack is evaluated based on the following fault
events.
Definition III.1 (Fault events). Let Eb(m, l), Ee(m, l) and
Se(m, l) be the fault events that Bob decodes (m, l) wrong,
Eve decodes m wrong, and Eve successfully guesses l respec-
tively when (m, l) is the public and private message pair. i.e.
Eb(m, l) := {φb(W
n
b (f(m, l))) 6= (m, l)}
Ee(m, l) := {φe(W
n
e (f(m, l))) 6= m}
Se(m, l) := {l ∈ ψ(W
n
e (f(m, l)))}
The corresponding (average) fault probabilities (over the mes-
sage set M × L), eb, ee and se can be computed as follows.
(3a)
(3b)
(3c)
eb = Avg
m∈M,l∈L
∑
x∈Xn
Wnb (Φ
c
b(m, l)|x)f(x|m, l)
ee = Avg
m∈M,l∈L
∑
x∈Xn
Wne (Φ
c
e(m)|x)f(x|m, l)
se = Avg
m∈M,l∈L
∑
x∈Xn
Wne (Ψ(l)|x)f(x|m, l)
where Φcb(m, l) and Φce(m) are the complements of the
Φb(m, l) and Φe(m) respectively; and Avgm∈M,l∈L denotes
1
ML
∑
m∈M,l∈L. When there is ambiguity, we will write
eb(f, φb,Wb) etc. to explicitly state its dependencies.
We study the asymptotic properties when the sizes M and
L of the message sets and λ of Eve’s guessing list grow
exponentially while the fault probabilities decay exponentially
in n. The exponential rates are defined as follows.
Definition III.2. Consider a sequence of n-block transmis-
sions (f (n), φ(n)b , φ
(n)
e , ψ(n)) (n ∈ Z+) over the wiretap chan-
nel (Wb,We), the public message rate RM , private message
4rate RL and the guessing rate Rλ are defined as,
(4a)
(4b)
(4c)
RM := lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logM (n)
RL := lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logL(n)
Rλ := lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logλ(n)
The exponents of the fault probabilities (3) are defined as,
(5a)
(5b)
(5c)
Eb := lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log e
(n)
b
Ee := lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log e(n)e
Se := lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log s(n)e
where e(n)b and alike denotes eb evaluated with respect to the
n-block transmission. For simplicity, the superscript (n) will
be omitted hereafter if there is no ambiguity.
In the code design phase prior to the transmission phase,
Alice chooses (f, φb, φe) without knowledge of ψ and then
Eve chooses ψ knowing Alice’s choice. In particular, Eve
chooses ψ to minimize Se so that her success probability
s
(n)
e decays to zero as slowly as possible, while Alice chooses
(f, φb, φe) to make Eb, Ee and Se large so that the error
probabilities e(n)b and e
(n)
e decay to zero fast for reliability, and
the probability s(n)e of successful attack by Eve decays to zero
fast for secrecy. The tradeoff between secrecy and reliability
for Alice can be expressed in terms of the set of achievable
rate and exponent triples defined as follows.
Definition III.3 (Achievable rate and exponent triples). The
rate triple (R1, R2, R3) ∈ R3+, where R+ := {a ∈ R : a ≥ 0},
is achievable if there exists a sequence of wiretap channel
codes (f, φb, φe) with rates,
RM ≥ R1 and RL ≥ R2
such that for any sequence of list decoding attack ψ with
guessing rate Rλ ≤ R3, the probabilities eb, ee and se
converge to zero as n→∞.
The exponent triple (E1, E2, E3) ∈ R3+ is achievable with
respect to the rate triple if in addition that,
Eb ≥ E1 and Ee ≥ E2 and Se ≥ E3
If the achievable exponents are strictly positive, the rate triple
is said to be strongly achievable.
In the sequel, we will obtain an inner bound to the set
of achievable exponent triples in the form of parameterized
single-letter lower bounds, one for each exponent.3 From this,
3In response to the question of using average instead of maximum error
probabilities (over the message set), we would like to point out that the
particular inner bound to be derived also holds when eb and ee are defined as
the corresponding maximum error probabilities and se as the average success
probability. It follows from the usual argument of successively expurgating
worst half of the codewords as in [6], which turns out to preserve the desired
overlap property of the code and hence the bound for the success exponent.
(see Section V) If one defined se as the maximum probability however, the
problem becomes degenerate since there is an obvious strategy for Eve to
achieve se = 1.
an inner bound to the set of strongly achievable rate triples will
be obtained, the closure of which coincides with the closure of
the achievable region in Theorem 1 of [2] when the guessing
rate is treated as equivocation rate.
IV. CODING SCHEME
The coding scheme (i.e. the specification of the sequence
of wiretap channel codes (f, φb, φe), see Fig. 3) considered
here is a merge of the schemes in [2] and [6] using the
method of types developed by Csisza´r[3]. We will describe
each key component of the code in succession and explain
how each of them simplifies the analysis of the fault events
(see Definition III.1).
A. Constant composition code
As a first step, output of the stochastic encoder is restricted
to constant composition code[3] defined as follows. Let
N(x|x) denote the number of occurrences of symbol x ∈ X
in the n-sequence x ∈ Xn. The type or empirical distribution
Px of x is defined as the probability mass function,
(6) Px(x) := N(x|x)
n
∀x ∈ X
Let Pn(X ) := {Px : x ∈ Xn} denote the set of all possible
types of an n-sequence in Xn. The type class T (n)Q := {x :
Px = Q} or TQ for short denotes the set of all n-sequences
x having type Q ∈ Pn(X ). An n-block constant composition
code θ on X is an ordered tuple of codewords all from the
same type class on X . i.e. ∃Q ∈ Pn(X ), θ ⊂ TQ.
Suppose θ is the constant composition code of type Q for
the stochastic encoder f . Then, f(x|m, l) = 0 for all x /∈ θ.
From (3a),
(7) eb = Avg
m∈M,l∈L
∑
c∈θ
Wnb (Φ
c
b(m, l)|c)f(c|m, l)
and similarly for other probabilities in (3). To further simplify
the expressions, define the canonical conditional type Py|x of
y given x as,
(8) Py|x(y|x) :=


1/|Y| , N(x|x) = 0
N(x, y|x,y)
N(x|x)
, otherwise
for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , where N(x, y|x,y) is the number of oc-
currences of the pair (x, y) in the n-sequence {(x(i), y(i))}ni=1
of pairs. The canonical conditional type of y given x exists and
is unique by definition.4 However, with a canonical conditional
type V given x specified, there can be more than one y
satisfying it.5 If V : X 7→ Y is the conditional type of y
given x, y is said to lie in TV (x), referred to as the V -shell
of x or the conditional type class of V given x. In other
4 This is a minor modification of the conditional type defined in Defini-
tion 1.2.4 of [3], according to which y may have a continuum of conditional
types V given x since V (y|x) can be arbitrary when N(x|x) = 0.
5For example, the binary sequences 1100 and 0011 have the same canonical
conditional type given 1111, i.e.
[
.5 .5
]
. Similarly, 1111 has the same
canonical conditional type whether it is given 1100 or 0011, i.e.
[
0 1
]
.
5words, TV (x) is the set of all y ∈ Yn with conditional type
V given x.
Writing Wnb (y|c) as the product
∏
x,yWb(y|x)
N(x,y|c,y)
,
Lemma 1.2.6 of [3] gives, for all y ∈ TV (c),
(9a)
(9b)
Wnb (y|c) = exp {−n[D(V ‖Wb|Q) +H(V |Q)]}
=
Wnb (TV (c)|c)
|TV (c)|
∵ (9a) is uniform
where the conditional information divergence D(V ‖Wb|Q)
and conditional entropy H(V |Q) are defined as,
(10)
(11)
D(V ‖W |Q) :=
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
Q(x)V (y|x) ln
V (y|x)
W (y|x)
H(V |Q) :=
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
Q(x)V (y|x) ln
1
V (y|x)
The key implication is that Wnb (y|c) depends on y only
through the conditional type Py|c and channel output Wnb (c)
is uniformly distributed within every V -shell TV (c).
Let Vn(Q,Y) := {Py|x : x ∈ TQ,y ∈ Yn} (Vn(Q) or Vn
for short) be the set of all possible canonical conditional types
of y given c. This set depends on c only through the type Q
of c.6 {TV (c) : V ∈ Vn(Q)} is a partitioning of Yn for every
c ∈ θ because every y has a unique canonical conditional type
given c. We can therefore partition the probabilities by Vn(Q)
as follows. From (7),
eb = Avg
m,l
∑
c∈θ
∑
V ∈Vn
Wnb (Φ
c
b(m, l) ∩ TV (c)|c)f(c|m, l)
=
∑
V ∈Vn
∑
c∈θ
Wnb (TV (c)|c)Avg
m,l
|Φcb(m, l) ∩ TV (c)|
|TV (c)|
f(c|m, l)
where the last equality is due to the piecewise uniform
distribution of the channel output Wnb (c) implied by (9). By
Lemma 1.2.6 of [3],7
(12) Wnb (TV (c)|c) ≤ exp {−nD(V ‖Wb|Q)}
Thus, eb can be upper bounded as,
(13) eb ≤
∑
V ∈Vn(Q)
exp {−nD(V ‖Wb|Q)}×
×
∑
c∈θ
Avg
m∈M,l∈L
|Φcb(m, l) ∩ TV (c)|
|TV (c)|
f(c|m, l)
B. Transmission of junk data and prefix DMC
In the previous section, the use of constant composition
code simplifies the probability (3a) to (13) and similarly for
other probabilities in (3). In this section, we shall specify
6For example, if y = 011 is in the V -shell of c = 011, then permutation
y
′ = 110 of y is in the V -shell of the same permutation c′ = 110 of c. In
general, if V is a canonical type of some sequence y ∈ Yn given c ∈ θ then
the V -shell of another codeword c′ ∈ θ must contain a sequence y′ ∈ Yn,
namely the sequence obtained from y by the same permutation of c ∈ θ to
c
′ ∈ θ. Thus, the set of all possible canonical conditional types are the same
if the conditioning sequences have the same type.
7The key step in the derivation is that V n(TV (c)|c) ≤ 1 implies
|TV (c)| ≤ exp{nH(V |Q)} by (9) with Wb replaced by V .
the structure of the stochastic encoder f and its uniform
randomization over junk data as follows.
Consider indexing the codewords in θ as cjlm by j ∈ J ,
l ∈ L and m ∈M . i.e.
(14) θ := {cjlm}j∈J,l∈L,m∈M
Set f(m, l) = cJlm where the junk data J is a random
variable Alice chooses uniformly randomly from {1, . . . , J}.
The conditional probability f is,
(15) f(c|m, l) =
{
1
J
, if c ∈ {cjlm : j ∈ J}
0 , otherwise
This approach of providing secrecy, illustrated in Example A.2
in the Appendix, will be called transmission of (uniformly
random) junk data because J is not meant to be a message
although it is encoded like one.8 Substituting this into the
upper bound of eb in (13) and similarly for the other fault
probabilities gives the following expressions.
Lemma IV.1 (Constant composition code, transmission of
junk data). Using n-block constant composition code θ in (14)
of type Q ∈ P(X ) and the transmission of junk data approach
(15), the probabilities in (3) can be upper bounded as follows,
(16a)
(16b)
(16c)
eb ≤
∑
V ∈Vn(Q)
exp {−nD(V ‖Wb|Q)}Avg
j,l,m
|Φcb(m,l)∩TV (cjlm)|
|TV (cjlm)|
ee ≤
∑
V ∈Vn(Q)
exp {−nD(V ‖We|Q)}Avg
j,l,m
|Φce(m)∩TV (cjlm)|
|TV (cjlm)|
se ≤
∑
V ∈Vn(Q)
exp {−nD(V ‖We|Q)}Avg
j,l,m
|Ψ(l)∩TV (cjlm)|
|TV (cjlm)|
where Avgj,l,m is over j ∈ J , l ∈ L and m ∈M .
Note that the randomization in the encoder is equivalent to
the averaging over the message augmented with junk data.
Another approach of randomization introduced in [2] is
the prefix discrete memoryless channel (prefix DMC), which
is characterized by the conditional probability distribution
V˜ ∈ P(X )X˜ from some finite set X˜ . The stochastic encoder
first maps (m, l) into an n-sequence in X˜n, which is then fed
through the extended prefix DMC V˜ n before being transmitted
through the channel. To combine this with the transmission of
junk data approach, let f˜ be the original stochastic encoder
defined in (15) except that X is replaced by X˜ , and θ is a
constant composition code with type Q on X˜ . Then, the new
encoder is,
f(x|m, l) :=
∑
c∈θ
V˜ n(x|c)f˜(c|m, l) ∀m ∈M, l ∈ L,x ∈ Xn
This is illustrated in Fig. 4(a).
The prefix DMC can be viewed as part of the wiretap
channel instead of the encoder as in Fig. 4(b) because the
wiretap channel (Wb,We) prefixed with any discrete memory-
less channel V˜ is just another wiretap channel (V˜ Wb, V˜ We),
8It turns out that J can also be reliably decoded by Bob with lower level
of secrecy. Thus, one may choose J to be meaningful private data to achieve
a new notion of unequal security protection. However, it suffices for our case
of interest to treat J as meaningless.
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where the product V˜ Wb is the matrix multiplication. Thus,
any performance metric, say e(Wb,We), that one obtains
without prefix discrete memoryless channel can be converted
to the performance metric with prefixing discrete memoryless
channel as e(V˜ Wb, V˜ We).
Because of this simplicity in extending any performance
metrics with prefix DMC, we will leave this prefixing pro-
cedure to the very end and use the encoder defined in (15)
for the main analysis. For a simple comparison between the
prefix DMC and transmission of junk data approach, readers
can refer to Example A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
C. Random code construction and MMI decoding
As a summary, encoder f encodes the public and private
messages m and respectively l, and the junk data J into a
codeword cJlm in the constant composition code θ of type Q.
The codeword is then transmitted through the wiretap channel
(Wb,We), to which a prefix a DMC {V˜ } will be added in the
end. The fault probabilities simplify to (16), with (Wb,We)
replaced by (V˜ Wb, V˜ We) for the prefix DMC. It remains to
specify how the codebook θ and decoders (φb, φe) should be
constructed.
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner[2] consider maximal code construction
with typical set decoding for the wiretap channel. This cannot
be used here since typical set decoding fails to give exponential
decay rate for the error probabilities. We will adopt the random
code construction scheme with maximum mutual information
(MMI) decoding in [6] instead.
As a preliminary for the random code construction, some
finite set U is chosen. The wiretap channel is trivially ex-
tended with an additional input symbol from U to (Wb ∈
P(Y)U×X ,We ∈ P(Z)
U×X ), where
(17) Wb(y|u, x) :=Wb(y|x)
We(y|u, x) :=We(y|x)
for all (u, x) ∈ U ×X . In the form of the stochastic transition
function, Wb(u, x) := Wb(x) and We(u, x) := We(x), which
means that the extended channel simply ignores the additional
input symbol. Thus, this trivial extension is purely conceptual
and does not change the original problem.
As the first step in the random code construction, a type
Q0 ∈ Pn(U) on U is chosen for the constraint length n.
Then, each of the set Θ0 := {Um}m∈M of n-sequences is
uniformly randomly and independently (u.i.) chosen from the
type class TQ0 . i.e.
PUm(u) =
{
1
|TQ0 |
,u ∈ TQ0
0 , otherwise
∀m ∈M
Next, a conditional type Q1 (∈ Vn(Q0,X )) is chosen. For
each Um generated, consider its Q1-shell TQ1(Um). Each of
the set Θ1(m) := {Xjlm}j∈J,l∈L of n-sequences is chosen
u.i. from TQ1(Um). i.e.
PXjlm|Um(x|u) =
{
1
|TQ1(u)|
,x ∈ TQ1(u)
0 , otherwise
for all (j, l,m) ∈ J × L×M,u ∈ TQ0 .
Finally, Um := {U(i)m }ni=1 and Xjlm := {X
(i)
jlm}
n
i=1 are
combined into one codeword Cjlm := Um ◦ Xjlm, where ◦
denotes the element-wise concatenation. i.e.
(18) Um ◦ Xjlm = {(U(i)m ,X(i)jlm)}ni=1
The i-th term C(i)jlm := (U
(i)
m ,X
(i)
jlm) is transmitted in the i-
th use of the (extended) wiretap channel. The random code
Θ is defined as the ordered structure {Cjlm}j∈J,l∈L,m∈M .
Its type is denoted as Q ∈ Pn(U ,X ) where Q(u, x) :=
Q0(u)Q1(x|u) ((u, x) ∈ U × X ). We write Q = Q0 ◦ Q1
where ◦ denotes the direct product.
Definition IV.1 (Random code). The random code Θ of type
Q := Q0 ◦ Q1 (Q0 ∈ Pn(U), Q1 ∈ Vn(Q0,X )) for the
extended wiretap channel (17) is defined as follows,
Θ := {Cjlm}jlm
Cjlm := Um ◦ Xjlm
Θ0 := {Um}m
u.i.←−− TQ0
Θ1(m) := {Xjlm}jlm
u.i.←−− TQ1(Um)
In words, it is the set of codewords Cjlm indexed by the
messages j ∈ J , l ∈ L and m ∈ M . Each codeword consists
of an n-sequence Um that belong to the random codebook Θ0,
and an n-sequence Xjlm that belongs to the random codebook
Θ1(m). The codewords from Θ0 are selected u.i. from the
type class TQ0 and the codewords from Θ1(m) are selected
u.i. from the Q1-shell TQ1(Um) of Um.
This approach of random code construction is well-known
in the asymmetric broadcasting channel setting. Θ0 is used to
partition Xn into cells/clouds {TQ1(Um)}m that are intended
to be well distinguishable through the channels of both Bob
and Eve, and Θ1(m) are the set of codewords selected from
the containing cell that are intended to be well distinguishable
by Bob but not necessarily so by Eve. The addition of input
symbol from U gives an additional degree of freedom in
optimizing the average performance of the code.
7It is important to note that, unlike the randomness in
the stochastic encoding, the randomness in the codebook is
known to all parties (Alice, Bob and Eve). The randomization
happens in the code design phase before the public and private
messages are generated for the transmission phase.
With the structure of the codebook defined, we can now
complete the specification of the coding scheme with the
maximum mutual information (MMI) decoder for Bob and Eve.
Consider a particular realization θ of the random code Θ. Let
I(Q, V ) denote the mutual information,
(19) I(Q, V ) := H(QV )−H(V |Q) see (11)
Then, I(c∧y), referred to as the empirical mutual information
between x and y, are defined as,
(20) I(x ∧ y) := I(Px, Py|x) see (19),(6),(8)
Suppose Bob observes y ∈ Yn through his channel. He
searches for the codeword c ∈ θ that maximizes the empirical
mutual information I(c ∧ y).9 If there is a unique cjlm that
achieves the maximum, he declares m as the public message
and l as the private message. More precisely,
(21) φb(y) = (m, l) ⇐⇒
∃!(m, l, j), I(cjlm ∧ y) = max
c∈θ
I(c ∧ y)
Similarly, suppose Eve receives z. She searches for the unique
um that achieves the maximum maxu∈θ0 I(u ∧ z).10 i.e.
(22) φe(z) = m ⇐⇒ ∃!m, I(um ∧ z) = max
u∈θ0
I(u ∧ z)
We will not need to assume any structure for ψ other than
the fact it has to be a deterministic list decoder with fixed list
size λ.11 The coding scheme without prefix DMC can now be
summarized as follows.
Definition IV.2 (Coding scheme). The coding scheme without
prefix DMC for a realization θ of the random code in Defini-
tion IV.1 is defined as follows.
Encoding: Alice generates the junk data J uniformly randomly
from {1, . . . , J} and encodes the common message m ∈ M
and secret l ∈ L into (um,xJlm) ∈ θ. She only transmits
XJlm through the channel. The encoding function is therefore,
f(x|m, l) :=
{
1
J
x ∈ {xjlm}j∈J
0 , otherwise
, or equivalently
f(m, l) := xJlm ∈ θ1(m) , ∀m ∈M, l ∈ L
Decoding: If Bob receives y, he finds a codeword c ∈ θ that
maximizes the empirical mutual information I(c∧y) and use
9Note that the optimal decoding rule is the maximum likelihood decoding
instead. MMI decoding is adopted here for simplicity.
10One may think that Eve can search for the unique cjlm that achieves the
maximum maxc∈θ I(c∧ z), and declare m as the public message. Because
of the suboptimality of the MMI decoding and the random code construction,
this choice turns out to be unfavorable.
11It is clear, however, that the optimal ψ is an extension of the maximum
likelihood decoding rule with λ estimates instead of one.
its location in θ to decode (m, l). The decoding function can
be defined as,
φb(y) = (m, l) ⇐⇒ ∃!(m, l, j), I(cjlm ∧ y) = max
c∈θ
I(c ∧ y)
Similarly, Eve locates the mutual information maximizing
codeword in θ0 to decode m as follows,
φe(z) = m ⇐⇒ ∃!m, I(um ∧ z) = max
u∈θ0
I(u ∧ z)
The encoder and decoders are functions of the codebook θ,
i.e. f [θ](m, l|c), φb[θ](y) and Φb[θ](z; θ) etc.. However, for
notational simplicity, the dependence on θ will be omitted.
Using the random coding scheme, we can further bound the
fault probabilities (16) with the expected fault probabilities
over the random code ensemble as follows. From (16a), the
expectation of eb over the random code Θ is,
E(eb(Θ)) ≤
∑
V ∈Vn(Q)
exp {−nD(V ‖Wb|Q)}×
×
β(V,Θ,Φcb):=︷ ︸︸ ︷
E
(
Avg
j∈J,l∈L,m∈M
|Φcb(m, l) ∩ TV (Cjlm)|
|TV (Cjlm)|
)
≤ |Vn(Q)| max
V ∈Vn(Q)
exp {−nD(V ‖Wb|Q)} β(Θ,Φ
c
b)
≤ (n+ 1)|X ||Y|
s(Wb,Θ,Φ
c
b):=︷ ︸︸ ︷
max
V ∈Vn(Q)
exp {−nD(V ‖Wb|Q)}β(Θ,Φ
c
b)
where the last inequality is due to the Type Counting Lemma
|Vn(Q)| ≤ (n + 1)|X ||Y|.12 The expectation of ee and se can
be upper bounded similarly. By the union bound,
Pr
{
eb(Θ) > 3E(eb(Θ)) or
ee(Θ) > 3E(ee(Θ)) or
se(Θ) > 3E(se(Θ))
}
≤ Pr{eb(Θ) > 3E(eb(Θ))}
+ Pr{ee(Θ) > 3E(ee(Θ))}
+ Pr{se(Θ) > 3E(se(Θ))}
which is < 1 due to the Markov inequality Pr(A > αE(A)) <
1/α for non-negative random variable A and α > 0. Thus,
the complement of the event has positive probability, which
implies existence of a realization θ of Θ such that the fault
probabilities can be bounded simultaneously as follows,
(23a)
(23b)
(23c)
eb(θ) ≤ 3(n+ 1)
|X ||Y|s(Wb,Θ,Φ
c
b)
ee(θ) ≤ 3(n+ 1)
|X ||Y|s(We,Θ,Φ
c
e)
se(θ) ≤ 3(n+ 1)
|X ||Y|s(We,Θ,Ψ)
where s is defined as follows,
(24a)
(24b)
β(V,Θ,Φ) := E
(
Avg
j∈J,l∈L,m∈M
|Φ(m, l) ∩ TV (Cjlm)|
|TV (Cjlm)|
)
s(W,Θ,Φ) := max
V ∈Vn(Q)
exp {−nD(V ‖W |Q)}β(V,Θ,Φ)
and Φe(m, l) := Φe(m), Ψ(m, l) := Ψ(l) are the trivial
extensions for all (m, l) ∈M × L.
To compute the desired exponents, we consider a sequence
of random codes defined as follows.
12 This follows from the definition (8) that there are at most n+1 possible
values for each entry of a canonical conditional type. (see Type Counting
Lemma 2.2 of [3].)
8Definition IV.3 (Sequence of random codes). {Θ(n)} or
simply Θ denotes a sequence of random codes Θ(n) (see
Definition IV.1) of type Q(n) = Q(n)0 ◦ Q(n)1 (Q(n)0 ∈
Pn(U), Q
(n)
1 ∈ Vn(Q
(n)
0 ,X )) that converges to distribution
Q = Q0 ◦ Q1 (Q0 ∈ P(U), Q1 ∈ P(X )U ) in variation
distance. i.e. δvar(Q(n), Q)→ 0, where
(25) δvar(P,Q) := max
A⊂X
P (A)−Q(A)
Furthermore, J (n) grows exponentially at the junk data rate
(26) lim
n→∞
1
n
log J (n) = RJ ≥ 0
If one can find γb(V,Q) continuous in Q ◦ V in variation
distance such that,
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log β(V (n),Θ(n), (Φ
(n)
b )
c) ≥ γb(V,Q)
for any Q(n) ◦V (n) converging to Q◦V in variation distance,
then Bob’s error exponent (5a) can be lower bounded as,
Eb(θ) = lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log s(V (n),Θ(n), (Φ
(n)
b )
c)
≥ min
V ∈P(Y)U×X
D(V ‖Wb|Q) + γb(V,Q)
and similarly for other exponents Ee and Se in (5).
Lemma IV.2. If γb(V,Q), γe(V,Q) and γ(V,Q) are continu-
ous in the joint distribution Q◦V (with respect to the variation
distance (25)) and lower bound the exponent,
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log β(V,Θ,Φ)
for random code Θ and the cases Φ equal to Φcb, Φce and Ψ
respectively, then there exists a realization θ of Θ such that
(27a)
(27b)
(27c)
Eb(θ) ≥ min
V ∈P(Y)U×X
D(V ‖Wb|Q) + γb(V,Q)
Ee(θ) ≥ min
V ∈P(Z)U×X
D(V ‖We|Q) + γe(V,Q)
Se(θ) ≥ min
V ∈P(Z)U×X
D(V ‖We|Q) + γ(V,Q)
In the sequel, we will compute γb, γe and γ to obtain the
desired lower bounds of the exponents.
V. SUCCESS EXPONENT
From Lemma IV.2, to obtain a lower bound of the achiev-
able13 success exponent Se (5c), it suffices to compute a lower
bound γ(V ) on the exponent of the expected average fraction
β(V,Θ,Ψ) for any Ψ satisfying the guessing rate (4c).
Consider first some realization θ of the random code Θ in
Definition IV.1.
β(V, θ,Ψ) =
1
J |TV (c111)|
Avg
l,m
∑
j∈J
|Ψ(l) ∩ TV (cjlm)| by (24a)
since |TV (cjlm)| depends on cjlm only through its type Q (and
n). The fraction can be made small if ∑j |Ψ(l) ∩ TV (cjlm)|
on the R.H.S. is made small for each l and m. Imagine Ψ(l)
13Achievable here does not refer to achievable by Eve, but achievable by
Alice as defined in Definition III.3.
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as a net that Eve uses to cover the shells {TV (cjlm) : j ∈ J}
owned by Alice as much as possible. Roughly speaking, since
the net cannot be too large due to the list size constraint, Alice
should spread out the shells as much as possible to minimize
her loss. We will refer to this heuristically desired property of
θ that the V -shells {TV (cjlm) : j ∈ J} spread out for every
V , m and l as the overlap property.14 This is illustrated in
Fig. 5, in which the configuration on the left has
∑3
j=1|Ψ(1)∩
TV (cj11)| three times larger than the one on the right.
Intuitively, random code has the overlap property on average
since it uniformly spaces out the codewords. This is made
precise with the following Overlap Lemma.
Lemma V.1 (Overlap). Let Xj (j = 1, . . . , J) be an n-
sequence uniformly and independently drawn from T (n)Q ⊂
Xn. For all J ∈ Z+, δ > 0, n ≥ n0(δ, |X ||Z|), z ∈ Zn, Q ∈
Pn(X ), V ∈ Vn(Q,Z) such that ⌊exp{nI(Q, V )}⌋ ≥ J , we
have,
Pr

∑
j∈J
1{z ∈ TV (Xj)} ≥ exp(nδ)

 ≤ exp(− exp(nδ))
where 1 is the indicator function and n0 is some integer-valued
function that depends only on δ and |X ||Z|.
In words, the lemma states that the chance of having
exponentially (exp(nδ)) many shells (from {TV (Xj) : j ∈ J})
overlapping at a spot (z) is doubly exponentially decaying
(exp(− exp(nδ))), provided that the shells are not enough to
fill the entire space (TQV ⊂ Zn) they can possibly reside.
(i.e. J ≤ ⌊exp{nI(Q, V )}⌋) For the case of interest, we will
prove the following more general form of the lemma with
conditioning.
Lemma V.2 (Overlap (with conditioning)). Let Q := Q0 ◦
Q1 (Q0 ∈ Pn(U), Q1 ∈ Vn(Q0,X )) be a joint type, U be a
random variable distributed over TQ0 , and Xj (j = 1, . . . , J)
be an n-sequence uniformly and independently drawn from
TQ1(U) ⊂ X
n
. For all J ∈ Z+, δ > 0, n ≥ n0(δ, |U||X |),
14Though not explicitly stated, this notion of overlap property is also evident
in [2] for the typical case when V is close to We. (See Lemma 2 of [2])
For the purpose of computing the exponent, we extend it to the atypical case
of V and relax the extent that the shells have to spread out by allowing
subexponential amount of overlap.
9z ∈ Zn, Q := Q0 ◦ Q1, V ∈ Vn(Q,Z) such that
⌊exp{nI(Q1, V |Q0)}⌋ ≥ J , we have,
(28) Pr

∑
j∈J
1 {z ∈ TV (U ◦ Xj)} ≥ exp(nδ)


≤ exp{− exp(nδ)}
where ◦ denotes element-wise concatenation (18), and
(29) I(Q1, V |Q0) := H(Q1|Q0)−H(V |Q0 ◦Q1)
= H(Q1|Q0)−H(V |Q)
denotes the conditional mutual information. (cf. (19))
Proof: For notational simplicity, consider the case when
exp(nδ) and exp{nI(Q1, V |Q0)} are integers.15 Consider
some subset J of {1, . . . , J} with |J | = exp(nδ). Since
the events z ∈ TV (U ◦ Xj) (j = 1, . . . , J) are conditionally
mutually independent given U = u ∈ TQ0 ,
Pr
{
z ∈
⋂
j∈J
TV (U ◦Xj)
}
=
∑
u∈TQ0
PU(u) Pr{z ∈ TV (u ◦ Xj)}
exp(nδ)
≤ exp
{
−n[I(Q1, V |Q0)−
δ
2
] exp(nδ)
}
for n ≥ n′0(δ, |U||X |), where the last inequality is by
Lemma A.1 using the uniform distribution of Xj and
Lemma 1.2.5 of [3] on the cardinality bounds of conditional
type class. Since exp{nI(Q1, V |Q0)} ≥ J , the number of
distinct choices of J is,(
J
exp(nδ)
)
≤
(
exp(nI(Q1, V |Q0))
exp(nδ)
)
≤ exp {[log e+ n(I(Q1, V |Q0)− δ)] exp(nδ)}
where the last inequality is by Lemma A.2. By the union
bound, L.H.S. of (28) is upper bounded by the product of
the last two expressions, i.e.(
J
exp(nδ)
)
Pr

z ∈ ⋂
j∈J
TV (U ◦ Xj)


Substituting the previously derived bounds for each term
gives the desired upper bound exp(− exp(nδ)) when n ≥
n0(δ, |U||X |).
Consider now a sequence of random codes Θ(n) defined
in Definition IV.3. The desired bound on the exponent of
β(V,Θ,Ψ) can be computed as follows using the Overlap
Lemma.
Lemma V.3 (Success exponent). Consider the random code
sequence Θ defined in Definition IV.3. For any sequence of list
decoding attack ψ satisfying the guessing rate Rλ (4c),
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log β(V,Θ,Ψ)
≥ |RL −Rλ + |RJ − I(Q1, V |Q0)|
−|+
15The case when exp(nδ) and I(Q1, V |Q0) are not integers can be derived
by taking their ceilings or floors and grouping the fractional increments into
some dominating terms.
where |a|+ := max{0, a} and |a|− := min{0, a}.
Proof: By the Overlap Lemma V.2, for any δ > 0 and
n ≥ n0(δ),
Pr

 ∑
j∈Jk(V )
1 {z ∈ TV (Cjlm)} ≥ exp(nδ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Θ0 = θ0


≤ exp{− exp(nδ)}
where Θ0 is the codebook {Um}m∈M , θ0 is an arbitrary
realization, and {Jk(V )}k∈KV is a partitioning of {1, . . . , J}
defined as,
Jk(V ) := {(k − 1)JV + 1, . . . ,min{kJV , J}}
JV := ⌊exp{nI(Q1, V |Q0)}⌋
KV := ⌈J/JV ⌉
The expectation of the sum of indicators on the left can then
be bounded as follows,
E
(∑
j∈Jk(V )
1 {z ∈ TV (Cjlm)}
∣∣∣∣ Θ0 = θ0
)
≤ exp(nδ) · 1 + J · exp{− exp(nδ)}
≤ exp(n2δ)
where the last inequality is true for n ≥ n0(δ, RJ , |U||X |) by
(26). Since TV (Cjlm) is contained by TQ1V (Um),∑
z∈Ψ(l)
E
(∑
j∈Jk(V )
1 {z ∈ TV (Cjlm)}
∣∣∣∣ Θ0 = θ0
)
=
∑
z∈Ψ(l)∩TQ1V (um)
E

 ∑
j∈Jk(V )
1 {z ∈ TV (Cjlm)}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Θ0 = θ0


≤ exp(n2δ) |Ψ(l) ∩ TQ1V (um)|
By linearity of expectation,
E
(∑
j∈Jk(V )
|Ψ(l) ∩ TV (Cjlm)|
∣∣∣∣ Θ0 = θ0
)
≤ exp(n2δ) |Ψ(l) ∩ TQ1V (um)|
Summing both sides over k ∈ KV ,
E
(∑
j∈J
|Ψ(l) ∩ TV (Cjlm)|
∣∣∣ Θ0 = θ0)
≤ exp(n2δ)KV |Ψ(l) ∩ TQ1V (um)|
Summing both sides over l ∈ L and applying the list size
constraint on Ψ in Lemma A.3 to the R.H.S.,
E
(∑
j∈J,l∈L
|Ψ(l) ∩ TV (Cjlm)|
∣∣∣ Θ0 = θ0)
≤ exp(n2δ)KV λ |TQ1V (um)|
Averaging both sides over m ∈ M , dividing by the constant
JL |TV (Cjlm)| and taking the expectation over all possible
realizations of θ0 gives,
β(V,Θ,Ψ) ≤ exp(n2δ)
KV λ
JL
|TQ1V (u1)|
|TV (c111)|
To compute the desired exponent from the last inequality,
denote the inequality in the exponent .6 as follows,
(30) an .6 bn ⇐⇒ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log an ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log bn
10
Then, KV
.
6 exp{n|RJ − I(Q1, V |Q0)|+}, J
.
6 exp{nRJ}
by (26), L .> exp{nRL} by (4b), λ .6 exp{nRλ} by
(4c), and |TQ1V (u1)| / |TV (c111)| is .6 exp{nI(Q1, V |Q0)}.
Combining these, β(V,Θ,Ψ) is .6 the following expression,
exp{n[RL −Rλ + [RJ − I(Q, V |Q0)]
− |RJ − I(Q, V |Q0)|
+]}
To obtain the desired bound, simplify this with the identity
|a|− ≡ a− |a|+, and the fact that β(V,Θ,Ψ) ≤ 1.
VI. ERROR EXPONENTS
The desired error exponents can be obtained directly from
the achievability result in [6] by grouping (j, l) ∈ J × L
as one private message for Bob. This is because the error
exponent that Bob decodes the private message wrong lower
bounds the exponent that Bob decodes the secret wrong.16 For
completeness, we provide a similar derivation in this section.
Readers familiar with [6] and may skip to the next section.
In essence of Lemma IV.2, the error exponents for Bob and
Eve can be obtained by lower bounding the exponents of the
fractions β(V,Θ,Φcb) and respectively β(V,Θ,Φce). Thus, the
objective is to prove the following lemma.
Lemma VI.1 (Error exponents). Consider the sequence of
random code Θ in Definition IV.3, and the MMI decoder
(decision region map) φb (Φb) (21) and φe (Φe) (22) for Bob
and respectively Eve. Then,
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log β(V,Θ,Φcb))
≤
∣∣∣I(Q1, V |Q0)−RJ −RL + |I(Q0, Q1V )−RM |−∣∣∣+
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log β(V,Θ,Φce)) ≤ |I(Q0, Q1V )−RM |
+
A. Exponent for Bob
In essence of Lemma IV.2, the error exponent for Bob can
be obtained by lower bounding the exponent of the fraction,
β(V,Θ,Φcb) = E
(
Avg
j∈J,l∈L,m∈M
|Φcb(m, l) ∩ TV (Cjlm)|
|TV (Cjlm)|
)
where Θ is the sequence of random codes in Definition IV.3
and Φb is the decision region of the MMI decoder φb in (21).
Φcb(m, l)∩ TV (Cjlm) is the set of bad observations in the V -
shell of Cjlm that lead to error if Cjlm is transmitted. With
the MMI decoder (21), this corresponds to the set of y ∈
TV (Cjlm) that has I(Cjlm ∧ y) no larger than I(Cj′l′m′ ∧
y) for some misleading codeword Cj′l′m′ where j′ ∈ J and
(l′,m′) ∈ L×M \ {l,m}. i.e.
Φcb(m, l) ∩ TV (Cjlm) = {y ∈ TV (Cjlm) ∩ TV ′(Cj′l′m′) :
(j′, l′,m′) ∈ W
(1)
b (m) ∪W
(2)
b (m, l), V
′ ∈ Vb(V )}
16Since Bob can also decode the junk data as reliably as the secret, one
may potentially transmit meaningful data instead of the junk provided that
the data is uniformly random and need not be secured at the same level as
the secret.
where
Vb(V ) := {V
′ ∈ Vn(Q) : I(Q, V
′) ≥ I(Q, V )}
W
(1)
b (m) := {(j
′, l′,m′) : j′ ∈ J, l′ ∈ L,m′ ∈M \ {m}}
W
(2)
b (m, l) := {(j
′, l′,m) : j′ ∈ J, l′ ∈ L \ {l}}
(The dependence on V , m and l will be omitted if there is no
ambiguity.) Vb is the set of problematic conditional type that
can lead to error. (W(1)b ,W
(2)
b ) forms a partition of the set
of indices for the misleading codewords. In particular, W(1)b
corresponds to the indices of misleading codewords that result
in decoding the public message wrong if the observation lies in
a problematic V ′-shell of the misleading codeword. Similarly,
W
(2)
b corresponds to the indices of misleading codewords that
result in decoding the private message wrong but decoding the
public message correctly.17 By the union bound,
|Φcb(m, l) ∩ TV (Cjlm)|
≤
∑
V ′∈Vb
∑
(j′l′m′)∈W
(1)
b
|TV (Cjlm) ∩ TV ′(Cj′l′m′)|
+
∑
V ′∈Vb
∑
(j′l′m′)∈W
(2)
b
|TV (Cjlm) ∩ TV ′(Cj′l′m′)|
Consider the second summation where Um′ = Um because
m′ = m. Since TV (Cjlm) ∩ TV ′(Cj′l′m′) is contained by
TQ1V (Um) ∩ TQ1V ′(Um) ⊂ TQV ∩ TQV ′
the summand is zero if QV 6= QV ′ or Q1V 6= Q1V ′ by
the uniqueness of (canonical conditional) types. Since the
premise implies I(Q0, Q1V ) = I(Q0, Q1V ′), we can impose
this constraint (temporarily) in the second summation without
affecting the sum. Under this equality constraint, however,
the inequality constraint I(V |Q) ≥ I(V ′|Q) on V ′ can be
replaced by I(Q1, V |Q0) ≥ I(Q1, V ′|Q0). Withdrawing the
equality constraint gives the following upper bound,
|Φcb(m, l) ∩ TV (Cjlm)|
≤
∑
V ′∈V (Q):
I(Q,V )≥I(Q,V ′)
∑
(j′l′m′)∈W
(1)
b
|TV (Cjlm) ∩ TV ′(Cj′l′m′)|
+
∑
V ′∈V (Q):I(Q1,V |Q0)
≥I(Q1,V
′|Q0)
∑
(j′l′m′)∈W
(2)
b
|TV (Cjlm) ∩ TV ′(Cj′l′m′)|
To bound the expectation on the left, it suffices to bound
the expectation of |TV (Cjlm) ∩ TV ′(Cj′l′m′)| on the right by
the Packing Lemma[3], which is stated in a convenient form
with conditioning in Lemma A.4.
If (j′, l′,m′) ∈ W(1)b (m), then Cjlm is independent of
Cj′l′m′ . Applying the Packing Lemma without conditioning
gives, for all δ > 0, n > n0(δ, |U||X |),
E
(
|TV (Cjlm)∩TV ′ (Cj′l′m′ )|
|TV (Cjlm)|
)
≤ exp {−n[I(Q, V ′)− δ]}
If (j′, l′,m′) ∈ W(2)b (m, l) instead, then Cjlm is conditionally
independent of Cj′l′m′ given Um. The Packing Lemma gives,
E
(
|TV (Cjlm)∩TV ′(Cj′l′m′)|
|TV (Cjlm)|
)
≤ exp {−n[I(Q1, V
′|Q0)− δ]}
17The reason for this separation is that the two types of error lead to two
different exponents.
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Combining the last three inequalities, we have for n suffi-
ciently large that,
E
(
|Φcb(m, l) ∩ TV (Cjlm)|
|TV (Cjlm)|
)
≤ JLM exp{−n[I(Q, V )− δ]}
+ JL exp {−n[I(Q1, V |Q0)− δ]}
where we have used the fact that |W(1)(m)| = JL(M−1) and
|W(2)(m, l)| = J(L−1); replaced I(Q, V ′) and I(Q1, V ′|Q0)
by their minima I(Q, V ) and respectively I(Q1, V |Q0) which
correspond to the most slowly decaying terms; and applied the
Type Counting Lemma to |Vn(Q)|. Hence,
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log β(V,Θ,Φcb)
≥ |min {I(Q, V )−RM , I(Q1, V |Q0)} −RJ −RL|
+
= |I(Q1, V |Q0)−RJ −RL + |I(Q1V |Q0)−RM |
−|+
because min{a, b} = b+min{0, a− b}.
B. Exponent for Eve
The exponent of β(V,Θ,Φce) for Eve can be calculated
analogously. With MMI decoding Φce(m)∩TV (Cjlm) is the set
of z ∈ TV (Cjlm) that has I(Um∧z) no larger than I(Um′∧z)
for some misleading codeword Um′ where m′ ∈ M \ {m}.
i.e.
Φce(m) ∩ TV (Cjlm) = {z ∈ TV (Cjlm) ∩ TQ1V ′(Um′) :
elsem′ ∈M \ {m}, V ′ ∈ Ve(V )}
where the set of problematic conditional types for Eve is
Ve(V ) := {V ′ ∈ V(Q) : I(Q0, Q1V ′) ≥ I(Q0, Q1V )}. By
the union bound,
|Φce(m) ∩ TV (Cjlm)| ≤
∑
V ′∈Ve(V )
∑
m′∈M\{m}
|TV (Cjlm) ∩ TQ1V ′(Um′)|
Since Cjlm is independent of Um′ where m′ 6= m, the Packing
Lemma A.4 without conditioning (but with Qˆ assigned as Q0,
and Vˆ assigned as Q1V ′) gives, for all n ≥ n0(δ, |U|),
E
(
|TV (Cjlm)∩TQ1V ′ (Um′ )|
|TV (Cjlm)|
)
≤ exp {−n[I(Q0, Q1V
′)− δ]}
Substituting this into the previous inequality, we have for n
sufficiently large that,
E
(
|Φce(m) ∩ TV (Cjlm)|
|TV (Cjlm)|
)
≤M exp{−n[I(Q0, Q1V )− δ]}
where we have replaced I(Q0, Q1V ′) by it minimum
I(Q0, Q1V ). The exponent is therefore,
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log β(V,Θ,Φce) ≥ |I(Q0, Q1V )−RM |
+
which completes the proof the Lemma VI.1
VII. RESULTS
The exponents of β(V,Θ,Ψ), β(V,Θ,Φcb) and β(V,Θ,Φce)
calculated in Lemma V.3 and Lemma VI.1 using the random
code in Definition IV.3 and the coding scheme in Defini-
tion IV.2 give an initial set of lower bounds to the exponents
by Lemma IV.2. As discussed in Section IV-B, the bounds can
then be extended with prefixed DMC V˜ by rewriting (Wb,We)
as (V˜ Wb, V˜ We).
To obtain the final version of the bounds, consider the
following rate reallocation: move the first R ∈ [0, RL] bits
of the secret to the end of the public message, and encode
them with a wiretap channel code at rate (RM +R,RL−R).
Theorem VII.1 (Inner bound of achievable exponent triples).
For every rate triple (RM , RL, Rλ), we have for all R ∈
[0, RL], RJ ≥ 0, finite sets U and X˜ , distribution Q :=
Q0◦Q1 (Q0 ∈ P(U), Q1 ∈ P(X )U ), transitional probability
matrix V˜ ∈ P(X )U×X˜ , the exponent triple (Eb, Ee, Se)
satisfying the following is achievable (see Definition III.3) for
the wiretap channel {Wb,We}.
Eb ≥ min
V ∈P(Y)U×X
D(V ‖V˜ Wb|Q)
+ |I(Q1, V |Q0)−RJ −RL +R
+ |I(Q0, Q1V )−RM −R|
−|+
Ee ≥ min
V ∈P(Z)U×X
D(V ‖V˜ We|Q)
+ |I(Q0, Q1V )−RM −R|
+
Se ≥ min
V ∈P(Z)U×X
D(V ‖V˜ We|Q)
+
∣∣∣RL −R−Rλ + |RJ − I(Q1, V |Q0)|−∣∣∣+
From this, we can compute an inner bound to the region
of strongly achievable rate triple for which above inner bound
to the achievable exponent triple are all strictly positive. To
simplify notation, let (U, X˜,X,Y,Z) be some random vari-
ables distributed as Q0(u)Q1(x˜|u)V˜ (x|u, x˜)Wb(y|x)We(z|x).
(Note that (U, X˜) → X → YZ.) Since information divergence
D(V ‖W ) is zero at V = W and positive otherwise, the
exponents are positive iff, for R ∈ [0, RL] and RJ ≥ 0
(31a)
(31b)
(31c)
(31d)
(31e)
RJ +RL −R < I(X˜ ∧ Y|U)
RJ +RL +RM < I(UX˜ ∧ Y)
RM +R < I(U ∧ Z)
RL −R > Rλ
RL −R+RJ > Rλ + I(X˜ ∧ Z|U)
R and RJ can be eliminated without loss of optimality by
the Fourier-Motzkin elimination[10] (see Lemma A.5), which
gives the following.
Theorem VII.2 (Inner bound of strongly achievable rate
triples). (RM , RL, Rλ) is strongly achievable for the wiretap
channel {Wb : X 7→ Y,We : X 7→ Z} if
(32a)
(32b)
(32c)
(32d)
(32e)
0 ≤ Rλ < RL
Rλ < I(X˜ ∧ Y|U)− I(X˜ ∧ Z|U)
0 ≤ RM < I(U ∧ Z)
RM +Rλ < I(U ∧ Y) + I(X˜ ∧ Y|U)− I(X˜ ∧ Z|U)
RM +RL < I(X˜ ∧ Y|U) + min{I(U ∧ Y), I(U ∧ Z)}
for some (U, X˜)→ X→ YZ with PY|X =Wb and PZ|X =We.
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It is admissible to have U as a deterministic function of X˜ and
|U| ≤ 4 + min{|X | − 1, |Y|+ |Z| − 2}
|X˜ | ≤ |U| (2 + min{|X | − 1, |Y|+ |Z| − 2})
which implies U→ X˜→ X→ YZ and I(UX˜∧Y) = I(X˜∧Y).
The admissible constraints are obtained from [2] as de-
scribed in Lemma A.6. They can be imposed without changing
the inner bound. Example A.4 illustrates how to compute an
inner bound of the achievable rate tuples using the Multi-
Parametric Toolbox[7] in Matlab.
The closure of the rate region of (RM , RL, Rλ) is indeed
equivalent to the closure of the rate region of (R0, R1, Re) in
Theorem 1 of [2]. More precisely, we have the following.
Proposition VII.3 (Equivalent rate region). Let R be the inner
bound of strongly achievable rate tuples (RM , RL, Rλ) in
Theorem VII.2, and R′ be the set of rate tuples that satisfies,
(33a)
(33b)
(33c)
(33d)
0 ≤ Rλ < RL
Rλ < I(X˜ ∧ Y|U)− I(X˜ ∧ Z|U)
0 ≤ RM < min{I(U ∧ Y), I(U ∧ Z)}
RM +RL < I(X˜ ∧ Y|U) + min{I(U ∧ Y), I(U ∧ Z)}
for some (U, X˜) → X → YZ with the same admissible
constraints as R. Then, R = R′.
Hence, R is convex by Lemma 5 of [2] and the closure
of its projection on (RM , RL) is the rate region for the
asymmetric broadcast channel by Corollary 5 of [2]. Suppose
Wb is more capable[5] than We, i.e. I(X ∧ Y) ≥ I(X ∧ Z)
for all PX ∈ P(X ). Then it is admissible to have X˜ = X
(i.e. no prefix DMC) by a straightforward extension of the
proof of Theorem 3 in [2]. It also follows that 0 ≤ Rλ <
maxPX [I(X ∧ Y) − I(X ∧ Z)] is the projection of R on Rλ.
Assume the stronger condition that Wb is less noisy[5] than
We, i.e. I(U ∧ Y) ≥ I(U ∧ Z) for any U → X → YZ. Then,
by Theorem 3 in [2], it is addmissible to have U deterministic
in addition to X˜ = X to obtain the projection on (RL, Rλ).
Proof of Proposition VII.3: Without loss of generality,
consider some U → X˜ → X → YZ with U ∩ X˜ = ∅. Let
Uα be a random variable such that it is X˜ with probability
α and U with probability 1 − α, and that 1{Uα = X˜} is
independent of (U, X˜,X,Y,Z).18 Then, U1 = X˜, U0 = U,
Uα → X˜→ X→ YZ,
I(Uα ∧ Y) = (1− α)I(U ∧ Y) + αI(X˜ ∧ Y)
I(X˜ ∧ Y|Uα) = I(X˜ ∧ Y)− I(Uα ∧ Y)
and similarly for Z. Thus, we can define Rα and R′α as the
corresponding rate polytopes defined by the linear constraints
in (32) and (33) respectively.
If we impose (33c) on R0, the resulting polytope is the same
as R′0 because (32c) and (32d) are redundant under (32b) and
(33c). Thus, R0 ⊃ R′0, which implies R ⊃ R′.
If I(U ∧ Z) ≤ I(U ∧ Y), then (33c) is equivalent to (32c).
By the previous argument, R0 = R′0.
18This proof technique is from the proof of Theorem 4.1 in [3, p.360].
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If I(X˜ ∧ Y|U) ≤ I(X˜ ∧ Z|U), then both R0 = R′0 = ∅ by
identical constraints (32b) and (33b).
Consider I(U ∧ Y) ≤ I(U ∧ Z) ≤ I(X˜ ∧ Z) ≤ I(X˜ ∧ Y).
Choose α such that I(Uα ∧ Y) = I(U ∧ Z). The convex hull,
Hull(R′0,R
′
α), contains R0 primarily because the hyperplane
of (32c) and (32d) for R0 intersects at,
Rλ = I(X˜ ∧ Y)− I(X˜ ∧ Z)
≤ I(X˜ ∧ Y|Uα)− I(X˜ ∧ Z|Uα)
which is contained by the half-space (33b) (with non-strict
inequality instead) for R′α. This is illustrated in Fig. 6. For
comparison, R0 is plotted with blue dotted frame in each
sub-figure. It is contained by the convex hull in Fig. 6(c) as
expected.
Finally, consider the case I(X˜ ∧ Y) < I(X˜ ∧ Z). Choose
α such that I(Uα ∧ Y) = I(X˜ ∧ Y) − I(X˜ ∧ Z|U).19 Then,
Hull(R′0,R
′
α) contains R0 primarily because the hyperplane
of (32d) intersects with the plane Rλ = 0 at,
RM = I(X˜ ∧ Y) − I(X˜ ∧ Z|U)
which is contained by the half-space (with non-strict inequal-
ity) of (33c) for R′α. This is illustrated in Fig. 7. Hence, we
have R0 a subset of Hull(R′0,R′α) for some α ∈ (0, 1), which
implies R ⊂ R′ as desired.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In doubt of a unifying measure of security, we have con-
sidered success exponent as an alternative to equivocation
rate for the wiretap channel considered in [2]. We replace
the maximal code construction and typical set decoding in
[2] with the random coding scheme and maximum empirical
19If I(X˜ ∧ Z|U) = 0, choose α to approach 1 from below to ensure that
R′α 6= ∅.
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mutual information decoding in [6]. The lower bounds on the
error exponents follow from [6] with the well-known Packing
Lemma (see Lemma A.4), while the lower bound on the
success exponent is obtained with the approach of [4] and
a technique we call the Overlap Lemma (see Lemma V.2).
This lemma gives a doubly exponential behavior that enables
us to guarantee good realization of the random code for
effective stochastic encoding by transmission of junk data (see
Section IV-B). Combining with the prefix DMC technique
in [2] that adds artificial memoryless noise to the channel
input symbols, and a rate reallocation step of transferring
some secret bits to the public message before encoding (see
Section VII), we obtain the final inner bound of the achievable
exponent triples in Theorem VII.1 with the corresponding
strongly achievable rate triples in Theorem VII.2. Proposi-
tion VII.3 shows that this inner bound to the rate region is
convex and coincides with the region of achievable rate triples
in Theorem 1 of [2].
It is a straightforward extension to consider the maximum
error exponents and average success exponent over the mes-
sages. The same bound follows by the usual expurgation argu-
ment and a more careful application of the doubly exponential
behavior of the Overlap Lemma. Whether this tradeoff is
optimal, however, is unclear. It would be surprising if one can
further improve the tradeoff by improving the coding scheme.
APPENDIX
Example A.1 (Maximum a priori and aposteriori success
probability). Consider the following probability matrix,
PZ :=
[
5
8
3
8
]
PS|Z :=
[
4
5
1
5
2
3
1
3
]
from which the a priori probability is PS =
[
3
4
1
4
]
. Without
knowing Z, Eve guesses S successfully with probability at
most 34 if one guess is allowed, and 1 if two guesses are
allowed. If she knows Z, she still has the same maximum
probability of success in each case because the most probable
candidate for the secret is the same regardless of whether
Z is observed. Hence, Eve cannot achieve a better success
probability regardless of Z, even though Z is not independent
of S. Success probability fails to express the notion of perfect
secrecy in this sense.
Example A.2 (Transmission of junk data). Consider the case
when there is no public message, and the coding is not
restricted to constant composition code. Fig. 8 illustrates the
approach of transmission of junk data through a wiretap
channel, which consists of a binary noiseless channel for Bob
and a binary erasure channel for Eve. While the channel
X
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X
0
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ε++
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(b) Channel We to Eve
l j cjl := (j, j ⊕ l)
0 0 00
0 1 11
1 0 01
1 1 10
f(l) := cJl , J ∼ Bern(.5)
(c) Stochastic encoder f
q
Fig. 8. An example of transmission of junk data
input is perfectly observed by Bob, half of it is erased on
average before it reaches Eve. Alice exploits this by sending
one bit of junk J uniformly distributed in {0, 1} together
with one bit of secret l ∈ {0, 1} in two channel uses. The
channel input is X = (J, J ⊕ l) where ⊕ denotes the XOR
operation. Bob can recover the secret perfectly by the decoder
φb(y) := y
(1) ⊕ y(2) since his observation Y is equal to
X. Eve can use the same decoding if there is no erasure.
However, if there is one or more erasures, her observation Z
becomes independent of the secret, in which case she should
uniformly randomly pick 0 or 1 as her guess to minimize the
conditional error probability, provided that she can only make
one guess.20 Thus, the conditional error probability is 0 if there
is no erasure, which happens with probability 1/4, and 1/2
otherwise. The overall conditional error probability is 3/8.
Note that if Alice uses a prefix DMC as described in
Section IV-B, Bob cannot achieve zero error probability. In
20We allow stochastic decoding here since the focus is the probability at
block length n = 2 instead of the exponent when n→∞.
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other words, prefix DMC is strictly inferior in this case.21
Example A.3 (Prefix discrete memoryless channel). Consider
prefixing the wiretap channel {Wb : X 7→ Y,We : X 7→ Z}
with the discrete memoryless channel {V˜ } defined in Fig. 9.
Each arrow connects an input alphabet to an output alphabet if
the corresponding transition probability, labeled in the arrow,
is non-zero. Consider the case without prefixing the wiretap
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(e) V˜ We
Fig. 9. An example of prefix discrete memoryless channel
channel with V˜ . Since Wb is a weakly symmetric channel, the
capacity is 1 bit by the capacity formula for weakly symmetric
in Theorem 8.2.1 of [1]. Bob can achieve the capacity of
1 bit with zero error probability and a single use of the
channel iff Alice encodes 1 bit of information using any of
the following codebooks θ(1) := {00, 10}, θ(2) := {00, 11},
θ(3) := {01, 10} and θ(4) := {01, 11}. If Alice wants to
have zero error probability for Bob in n channel uses with
rate n bits, the codebook has to be some concatenation of
codebooks from {θ(i)}4i=1. However, the channel input Xn
would not be independent of the channel output Zn to Eve. To
argue this, consider the i-th channel use only. Suppose Alice
uses θ(1) to encode a uniformly random bit at that time slot.
Then, given Z(i) = 0, we have X(i) = 10 with probability
2/3 rather than the prior probability 1/2. The other cases
can be argued similarly. In short, not randomizing over the
21It would be more interesting to find an example in which prefix DMC
is inferior even if Bob’s probability of error cannot be made to 0 by adding
noise with memory like what the transmission of junk data does.
code unavoidably leaks information to Eve. However, if the
randomization is done by transmitting junk data, the useful
data rate would drop below the capacity 1 bit.
Consider prefixing the wiretap channel with V˜ . The prefixed
channel V˜ Wb to Bob is a noiseless binary channel as shown
in Fig. 9(d). The prefixed channel V˜ We to Eve, however, is
completely noisy as shown in Fig. 9(e). One can check that the
channel output Z is independent of X for any input distribution
on X. Thus, Alice can transmit at the capacity 1 bit with zero
error probability for Bob but without leaking any information
to Eve. Prefixing discrete memoryless channel is strictly better
than transmitting junk data in this case.
Lemma A.1 (random codeword). For δ > 0, n ∈ Z+, Q :=
Q0 ◦ Q1 (Q0 ∈ Pn(U), Q1 ∈ Vn(Q0,X )), V ∈ Vn(Q,Z),
u ∈ TQ0 , n-sequence X uniformly randomly chosen from
TQ1(u), then
Pr{z ∈ TV (u ◦ X)} =
∣∣TX|U,Z(u, z)∣∣∣∣TX|U(u)∣∣
≤ exp {−n[I(Q1, V |Q0)− δ]}
where the last inequality holds for all n ≥ n0(δ, |U||X |);
(U,X,Z) in the first equality is a random tuple with joint
distribution PU,X,Z := Q0◦Q1◦V ; TPX|U,Z is denoted by TX|U,Z
and similarly for others; and ∣∣TX|U,Z(u, z)∣∣ with (u, z) ∈ TU,Z
is denoted by
∣∣TX|U,Z∣∣.
Proof: Consider z ∈ TQV , for which the desired prob-
ability is non-zero. Since u ∈ TU, X ∈ TX|U(u), and
z ∈ TZ, the event that {z ∈ TV (u ◦ X)}, or equivalently,
{z ∈ TZ|U,X(u ◦ X)}, happens iff (u,X, z) ∈ TU,X,Z. This
happens iff X ∈ TX|U,Z(u, z). Hence, for all z ∈ TZ,
Pr {z ∈ TV (u ◦ X)} = Pr
{
X ∈ TX|U,Z(u, z)
}
=
∣∣TX|U,Z(u, z)∣∣∣∣TX|U(u)∣∣
≤ exp{−n[I(X ∧ Z|U) + δ]}
where the last inequality is true for all n ≥ n0(δ, |U||X |) due
to Lemma 1.2.5 of [3] that
|TX|U,Z(u, z)| ≤ exp{nH(X|U,Z)}
|TX|U(u)| ≥ (n+ 1)
−|U||X | exp{nH(X|U)}
Since I(X∧Z|U) = I(Q1, V |Q0), this gives the desired bound.
Lemma A.2. For all n, exp(nR), exp(nδ) ∈ Z+(
exp(nR)
exp(nδ)
)
≤ exp {(log e+ n(R − δ)) exp(nδ)}
Proof: Let a := exp(nR) and b := exp(nδ). Then, we
have the well-known inequality that
(
a
b
)
≤
(
a
b
e
)b
, which gives
the R.H.S. of the bound as desired. To derive this, note that
ex ≥ (1 + x) for all x ≥ 0. Thus,
eax ≥ (1 + x)a =
a∑
i=1
(
a
i
)
xi =⇒
(
a
b
)
≤ eax−b ln x
Setting x = b/a gives the desired inequality.
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Lemma A.3 (list size constraint). For any subset S ⊂ Zn
of observations and list decoder ψ with list size λ, the
corresponding decision region map Ψ : L 7→ 2Zn satisfies,
(34)
∑
l∈L
|Ψ(l) ∩ S| = λ|S|
Proof: The proof is by the double counting principle,
∑
l∈L
|Ψ(l) ∩ S| =
∑
z∈S
∑
l∈L
1{l ∈ ψ(z)} =
∑
z∈S
λ = λ|S|
Lemma A.4 (Packing (with conditioning)). Consider some
finite sets U , X and Y , type Q0 ∈ Pn(U), and canonical
conditional types Q1 ∈ V (Q0,X ) and Qˆ1 ∈ V (Q0, Xˆ ). Let
Q := Q0 ◦Q1 and Qˆ := Q0 ◦ Qˆ1 be the corresponding joint
types; U be some random n-sequence distributed over TQ0; X
and Xˆ be independently and uniformly randomly drawn from
TQ1(U) and TQˆ1(U) respectively; C := U◦X and Cˆ := U◦Xˆ
denote the element-wise concatenations. Then, for all δ > 0,
n ≥ n0(δ, |U||X |), V ∈ Vn(Q,Y) ∩ Vn(Qˆ,Y),
E
(
|TV (C) ∩ TVˆ (Cˆ)|
|TV (C)|
)
≤ exp
{
−n[I(Qˆ1, Vˆ |Q0)− δ]
}
Proof: Consider some realization u ∈ TQ0 of U. By
conditional independence between X and Xˆ,
E
(
|TV (C) ∩ TVˆ (Cˆ)|
∣∣∣ U = u)
=
∑
y∈TQ1V (u)
Pr {y ∈ TV (u ◦ X)}Pr
{
y ∈ T
Vˆ
(u ◦ Xˆ)
}
≤
∑
y∈TQ1V (u)
|TX|U,Y|
|TX|U|
exp{−n[I(Qˆ1, Vˆ |Q0)− δ]}
=
|TY|U||TX|U,Y|
|TX|U|
exp{−n[I(Qˆ1, Vˆ |Q0)− δ]}
where the first inequality follows from Lemma A.1 (both the
equality and inequality cases) ∀n ≥ n0(δ, |U||X |) with U,
X and Y and TX|U,Y etc. defined analogously. Divide both
sides by |TV (u ◦ X)| = |TY|U,X|, and apply that fact that
|TY|U||TX|U,Y| = |TX|U||TY|U,X|,
E
(
|TV (C)∩TVˆ (Cˆ)|
|TV (C)|
∣∣∣ U = u) ≤ exp{−n[I(Qˆ1, Vˆ |Q0)− δ]}
Averaging both sides over U gives the desired bound.
Lemma A.5 (Fourier-Motzkin). The rate constraints in (31)
with R ∈ [0, RL] and RJ > 0 defines the same region of (non-
negative) rate triples (RM , RL, Rλ) as the rate constraints in
(32) do.
Proof: Consider applying the Fourier-Motzkin elimina-
tion. From (31) and R ∈ [0, RL], we have,
−R < 0
−R+RJ +RL < I(X˜ ∧ Y|U)
R−RL ≤ 0
R+RM < I(U ∧ Z)
R−RL +Rλ < 0
R−RJ −RL +Rλ < −I(X˜ ∧ Z|U)
RJ +RL +RM < I(UX˜ ∧ Y)
Adding each of the first two inequalities to the next four
eliminates R, which, together with RJ ≥ 0, gives,
−RJ ≤ 0
−RJ −RL +Rλ < −I(X˜ ∧ Z|U)
RJ +RL +RM < I(U ∧ Z) + I(X˜ ∧ Y|U)
RJ +Rλ < I(X˜ ∧ Y|U)
RJ +RL +RM < I(UX˜ ∧ Y)
RM < I(U ∧ Z)
−RL +Rλ < 0
Rλ < I(X˜ ∧ Y|U)− I(X˜ ∧ Z|U)
where we have removed some inactive constraints. Adding
each of the first two inequalities to the next three inequalities
eliminates RJ , which gives (32) as desired.
Example A.4 (Inner bound of strongly achievable rate triples).
Consider the following wiretap channel and prefix DMC.
% wiretap channel
p = 0 . 1 ; PYX =[ 1−p p ; p 1−p ; . 5 . 5 ] ; % PY|X
r = . 4 ; PZX = [1 0 ; 1−r r ; r 1− r ] ; % PZ|X
% input distributions and prefix DMC
PX = [ . 2 5 . 2 5 . 5 ] ; PtX = PX ; PXtX= eye ( 3 ) ; % PX , PX˜ and PX|X˜
q = . 3 ; PUtX = [1−q q ; 1 0 ; 0 1 ] ; % P
U|X˜
The prefix DMC is noiseless, i.e. X = X˜. The channel and U
are constructed based on Counter-example 2 in [5] with slight
modifications.22 Define the Bayes’ rule, conditional mutual
information and entropy functions as follows.
f u n c t i o n PXY= bayes (PYX, PX)
% compute PX|Y from PY|X and PX
PXY= repma t (PX , s i z e (PYX, 2 ) , 1 ) . ∗PYX’ ;
PXY=PXY . / repma t ( sum (PXY, 2 ) , 1 , s i z e (PXY , 2 ) ) ;
f u n c t i o n IQVP= I (Q, V, P ) % compute I(Q, V |P )
i f nargin<3
P= ones ( 1 , s i z e (Q , 1 ) ) . / s i z e (Q , 1 ) ;
end
IQVP=H(Q∗V, P)−H(V, P∗Q) ;
f u n c t i o n h=H(Q, P ) % compute H(Q|P )
Q(Q==0)=1 ;
h=−P∗sum ( l og2 (Q) .∗Q, 2 ) ;
Then, the mutual information expressions required for the rate
region can be computed as follows.
% derived values
PU = PtX∗PUtX ; PtXU = bayes ( PUtX , PtX ) ; % PU and PX˜|U
PYtX=PXtX∗PYX; PYU=PtXU∗PYtX ; % P
Y|X˜ and PY|U
PZtX=PXtX∗PZX; PZU=PtXU∗PZtX ; % P
Z|X˜ and PZ|U
IUY= I (PU , PYU ) ; ItXYU= I ( PtXU , PYtX , PU ) ; % I(U ∧ Y) and I(X˜ ∧ Y|U)
IUZ= I (PU , PZU ) ; ItXZU= I ( PtXU , PZtX , PU ) ; % I(U ∧ Z) and I(X˜ ∧ Z|U)
22This is such that the resulting constraints (32) on the rate region are not
redundant for the purpose of illustration.
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Using the Multi-Parametric Toolbox[7], we first define
the polytope satisfying the constraints from (31) on
(R,RJ , RM , RL, Rλ); and then project it to (RM , RL, Rλ),
which should give the desired region in (32).
% constraints from (31) on (R,RJ , RM , RL, Rλ)
A=[−eye ( 5 ) ; −1 1 0 1 0 ; 1 0 0 −1 0 ; 1 0 1 0 0 ;
1 0 0 −1 1 ; 1 −1 0 −1 1 ; 0 1 1 1 0 ] ;
b =[ z e r o s ( 1 , 5 ) ItXYU 0 IUZ 0 −ItXZU IUY+ItXYU ] ’ ;
P= poly tope (A, b ) ;
R= p r o j e c t i o n ( P , [ 3 4 5 ] ) ; % Project to (RM , RL, Rλ) to obtain (32)
Finally, plotting the region gives Fig. 10.
o p t i o n s . w i re =1 ; p l o t (R , o p t i o n s ) ;
x l a b e l (’R_M’ ) ; y l a b e l (’R_L’ ) ; z l a b e l (’R_{\lambda}’ ) ;
s e t ( gca , ’CameraPosition’ , [ 1 . 5 −0.5 1 ] , . . .
’CameraUpVector’ , [−0.5 0 . 2 0 . 8 ] ,’DataAspectRatio’ , [ 1 1 1 ] ) ;
PSfrag replacements
RM
RL
Rλ
(32a) (32b)
(32c)
(32d)
(32e)
0
0.05
0.1 0 0.05
0.1 0.15
0.2 0.25
0.3 0.35
0
0.05
0.1
Fig. 10. An example of an inner bound to strongly achievable rate tuples
As expected, each facet corresponds to a constraint in (32),
indicated in the figure.
Lemma A.6 (admissible constraints). Consider some random
variables in the Markov chain U′X˜′ → X′ → YZ distributed
over the finite sets U ′, X˜ ′, X , Y and Z respectively. Then
there exists U→ X˜→ X→ YZ with,
PY|X(y|x) = PY|X′(y|x) , ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y
PZ|X(y|x) = PZ|X′(z|x) , ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z
and
(35a)
(35b)
(35c)
(35d)
I(U ∧ Y) = I(U′ ∧ Y)
I(U ∧ Z) = I(U′ ∧ Z)
I(X˜ ∧ Y|U) = I(X˜′ ∧ Y|U′)
I(X˜ ∧ Y|U) = I(X˜′ ∧ Y|U′)
and
(36a)
(36b)
(36c)
|U| = 4 +min{|X | − 1, |Y|+ |Z| − 2}
|X˜ | = |U| (2 + min{|X | − 1, |Y|+ |Z| − 2})
H(U|X˜) = 0
Furthermore, X = X′ if |X | − 1 ≤ |Y|+ |Z| − 2.
Proof: Since the following proof is a minor extension to
[2, (A.22)], we will give only the changes as follows. Readers
should refer to [2] for details.
With X˜′′ := (U, X˜′), we have I(X˜′′ ∧ Y|U) = I(X˜′ ∧ Y|U)
and similarly for I(X˜′′ ∧ Z|U). It suffices to show the desired
existence with X˜′ replaced by X˜′′ on the R.H.S. of (35).
Consider the case |X | − 1 ≤ |Y|+ |Z| − 2. The admissible
constraint (36) is equivalent to [2, (A.22)]. (n.b. V in [2] is
X˜ here.) The proof therein also implies X = X′. because
(X′,Y,Z) need not be changed.
Suppose |X |− 1 > |Y|+ |Z|− 2 instead. To achieve H(Y )
and H(Z) in [2, (A.24), (A.25)], one can replace (A.23) by
(37)
Pr(Y = y) =
∑
u∈U
Pr{U = u}fy(p¯u)
Pr(Z = z) =
∑
u∈U
Pr{U = u}fz(p¯u)
where, using the notation in [2],
fy(p¯) := p¯
Y (y) and fz(p¯) := p¯Z(z)
Only |Y|−1 of the functions fy(p¯) and |Z|−1 of the functions
fz(p¯) are considered. Thus, as a consequence of the Eggleton-
Carathe´odory Theorem, U takes at most (|Y| + |Z| − 2) + 4
different values to preserve (A.24) to (A.27) in [2] and
(37) defined above. Similarly, (A.28) can be replaced by
the corresponding expressions on Pr(Y = y|U = u) and
Pr(Z = z|U = u). For every fixed u, there exists a random
variable Vu with no more than (|Y| + |Z| − 2) + 2 values
preserving the set of desired equalities. With X˜ here playing
the role of the new V in [2], (36) follows.
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